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In addition to directly addressing clinical practices
and patient outcomes, the Dialysis Outcomes and Prac-
tice Patterns Study (DOPPS) has been used as a plat-
form for economic and policy analyses. This paper will
summarize the results of two such efforts. The first is the
International Study of Health Care Organization and
Finance (ISHCOF), an important sub-study of the
DOPPS. The second summarized study shifts the focus
to incentives faced by dialysis patients, using DOPPS
patient survey data to assess out-of-pocket costs and
their impact on cost-related underuse of medication.
Potential new directions will also be highlighted.
International Study of Health Care
Organization and Finance (ISHCOF)
The ISHCOF implemented a one-time survey of eco-
nomics policy investigators in each of the 12 DOPPS
countries in 2004–2005 to assess economic incentives
and dialysis practices and outcomes at the country level.
The policy investigators summarized findings, and each
prepared a paper (1–12). The following summary is
based largely on an integrative overview paper (13) and
the 12 country-level papers. The policy investigators’
judgments were supplemented with data from secondary
sources such as published articles, national registry
reports, government documents, and websites. The
underlying premise of the ISHCOF studywas that dialy-
sis practices and outcomes result not only frompure clin-
ical judgments, but also from the economic incentives
and constraints created by each country’s health-care
financing system and institutional structure. These stud-
ies focused primarily on the incentives faced by dialysis
providers in each national payment system.
Thefirst setof issuespertained tomacro-level function-
ing of the end-stage renal disease (ESRD) payment and
care systems. Health-care systems vary markedly across
the ISHCOF countries, ranging from the United States’
relativelymarket-based system, to systemswithprimarily
private providers with funding either through competing
‘‘sick funds’’ (e.g., Germany) or governments (e.g., Can-
ada), to systemswhere the government is both payer and
provider of care (e.g., United Kingdom). Total spending
(not just for direct ESRD care) adjusted to 2003 US dol-
lars ranged from $24,000 per patient-year in New Zea-
land to $60,000 in the United States. This variation was
significantly, but not perfectly, correlated with per capita
expenditures on health care for the countries’ general
populations (r = 0.70, p = 0.01). The lack of perfect
correlation may reflect ESRD care being treated as a
‘‘special case’’ within some countries’ financing systems.
For example, US ESRD patients have a unique, disease-
specificentitlement tocoverage throughthe federalMedi-
care program. Partly through cost controls in this pro-
gram, US spending on ESRD patients, while still higher
than that in other countries, is not at the ‘‘outlier’’ level
seen for health spending in theUS general population. In
particular, the US payment for the actual dialysis treat-
ment is the second lowestamong theISHCOFcountries.
There appears to be little, if any, aggregate association
between total spending and patient mortality (r = 0.30,
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p = 0.35). As adjusting for case-mix (i.e., patient health
status) across countries can never be complete, the study
could not determine if the finding that higher spending
did not significantly improve outcomes could be attrib-
uted to system inefficiency. Therefore, assessment of the
role of resources and incentives in shaping ESRD care
and outcomes needs to be done on amore detailed basis.
The case studies compiled by the policy investigators for
the ISHCOF may allow a more nuanced view of
these issues, but conclusions should still be regarded as
suggestive.
This more detailed comparison can begin with pro-
vider payment methods and levels. Payment methodolo-
gies for dialysis centers differ substantially across
countries. Some countries employ variants of a per-
treatment payment, which may include a bundle of
ancillary services (e.g., Italy), or may allow separate, fee-
for-service billing for ancillary services such as injectable
medications (e.g., United States). Other countries use
variants of global budgeting systems administered by
regional authorities, which may provide relatively fixed
budgets to facilities (e.g., Canada,NewZealand), ormay
allow facilities to compete on a fee-for-service basis for
a greater share of the regional budget (e.g., Germany).
Nephrologist payment models range from fee-for-
service (e.g., Belgium) to capitation (e.g., United States)
to salary (e.g., Spain). Nephrologists’ incomes varymore
than fourfold, ranging from $58,000 in Sweden to
$250,000 in the United States and Canada. Patients in
countries with higher physician incomes may receive less
physician contact time, but this finding was not statisti-
cally significant (r = )0.32, p = 0.31).
The DOPPS has also documented wide variations in
intermediate outcome measures, including attained
serum albumin levels and hemoglobin values. Hemoglo-
bin values are relatively high in Sweden and the United
States, the latter of which pays facilities on a fee-for-
service basis for higher delivered doses of erythropoiesis-
stimulating agents (ESAs) (14). Likewise, the DOPPS
documents variability in process measures such as
dialysis modality, vascular access, labor inputs, dose of
dialysis, and dialyzer reuse practices. Dialysis modality
appears particularly amenable to incentives created by
health-care financing. High use of peritoneal dialysis,
which generally has lower costs than hemodialysis
(HD), might result from dialysis payment rates that do
not fully fund the cost of HD. High transplant rates
appear to result in countries that provide themost gener-
ous resources to procure and transplant organs. Other
practices, such as dialyzer reuse in the United States,
may be cost-saving measures in response to relatively
low payments per dialysis treatment. Comparing prac-
tices across countries can lead providers to reconsider
their own practices and how incentives might influence
them to practice differently than colleagues elsewhere.
These variations in outcomes and processes of care
suggest a potential role for direct quality incentives
(‘‘pay-for-performance’’). However, at the time of the
surveys, financial incentives focused on quantity of care
rather than quality. For example, there were no financial
incentives to encourage the use of arteriovenous fistulae
for vascular access despite evidence of better outcomes.
One of the few clear quality incentives is dialyzer reuse,
where many countries denied payment for hemodialysis
treatments if dialyzers were reused. Clearly, quality
incentives are an area for potential change. The United
States is currently studying quality incentives as part of a
demonstration project and in the broader context of
expanding the set of services included in the capitation
payment. Further, the United States has already created
indirect quality incentives by measuring and publicly
reporting on several dimensions of quality. To the extent
that physicians and patients use such information to
select facilities, financial incentives for better perfor-
mance would be created.
Finally, incidence rates of treated ESRDare positively
correlated with country per capita income (r = 0.72,
p = 0.02). Although it is possible that underlying dis-
ease patterns are correlated with income, this pattern
suggests more generous acceptance onto dialysis therapy
in countries with higher incomes. In the country-level
papers, only the authors from New Zealand, Canada,
and the United Kingdom acknowledged that rationing
may occur in their countries.
Patient Out-of-Pocket Costs and Medication
Adherence
Patients also face financial incentives via out-of-
pocket payments. In most countries, government pro-
grams, private insurers, or other ancillary sources of
funds pay the vast majority of direct dialysis costs, leav-
ing patients facing little financial obligation. However,
countries varymore substantially with regards to patient
out-of-pocket costs for prescription drugs.
A recent study based on DOPPS data (15) explored
the relationship between patient-reported out-of-pocket
costs for medication and nonadherence with pharma-
ceutical therapy. There was wide variation in out-of-
pocket costs for prescription drugs, ranging from $8 per
patient month in the United Kingdom to $114 in the
United States. Costs in the other DOPPS countries were
more closely distributed (Fig. 1). Similarly, self-reported
Fig. 1. Percentage of patients reporting having some out-of-
pocket drug spending versus mean total monthly spending, by
country, 2002–2004. Source: Author’s calculations using data
from the DOPPS. The area of each bubble equals the percentage
of patients reporting nonpurchase of medication because of cost.
R2 = 0.4372. PPP, purchasing power parity. Hirth et al. (15).
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nonadherence due to cost ranged widely from 3% of
patients in Japan to 29% in the United States. Fig. 1
shows the relationship between two dimensions of out-
of-pocket cost (mean monthly spending and percentage
of patients reporting any out-of-pocket costs) and non-
adherence rates, which are represented by the size of the
‘‘bubbles.’’ Generally, nonadherence rates rose with
higher mean out-of-pocket costs, but several countries
were outliers from this overall trend (r2 = 0.437,
p < 0.05). Swedish patients faced relatively high costs,
but were less likely than average to report cost-related
nonadherence. This result may possibly arise due to the
relatively high level of income supports provided by the
Swedish welfare state. Similarly, Japanese patients faced
moderate costs, but almost never reported nonadher-
ence. This result may arise from either cultural or finan-
cial reasons (e.g., Japanese physicians often directly
sell pharmaceuticals to their patients). Overall, good
adherence rates seemed to be related to national policies
that exempted large groups of patients from facing out-
of-pocket costs. In countries where such costs remain
significant, clinicians may be able to encourage adher-
ence by discussing costs and methods to acquire free or
discounted prescriptions.
Changes in Policy and Practice
The DOPPS has functioned as an important indepen-
dent data source to report changes in dialysis practice
associated with changes in policy. As one example, the
Japan DOPPS has monitored effects of the 2006 eryth-
ropoietin (EPO) reimbursement policy change on ane-
mia management practices in Japan. Our findings
suggest that the EPObundling policy resulted in reduced
EPO dosing and an increase in intravenous iron use,
while maintaining hemoglobin level, in Japanese HD
patients (16).
In the United States, important reimbursement policy
changes are forthcoming, as legislation mandates [1]
expansion by January 2011 of the current partially bun-
dled payment system to include separately billable ser-
vices (including ESA therapy) and [2] the introduction in
January 2012 of a quality incentive payment structure.
With implementation of these changes, the US dialysis
community will witness a major shift in the basic struc-
ture for dialysis payment, whichmay prompt substantial
changes in certain dialysis practices. The DOPPS can be
a vehicle to assist with monitoring national trends in
clinical practices, dialysis services offered, and achieve-
ment of performance measures that occur along with
these important policy changes.
Conclusion
The DOPPS research summarized here highlights the
potential value to clinicians of considering how eco-
nomic incentives affect dialysis practices and patients’
decisions. Further, understanding international varia-
tions may provide insight into alternatives to current
arrangements in one’s own country, thereby serving as
the basis for policy advocacy by professionals and their
associations. Finally, by using multiple waves of data,
the DOPPS platform can be used to examine the effects
on clinical practice of changes in policies and incentives
over time.
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